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Richard Montague was an exceptionally gifted logician who made im-
portant contributions in every eld of inquiry upon which he wrote. His
professional career was not only marked with brilliance and insight but it
has become a classic example of the changing and developing philosophical
views of logicians in general, especially during the 1960s and 70s, in regard
to the form and content of natural language. We shall, in what follows, at-
tempt to characterize the general pattern of that development, at least to
the extent that it is exemplied in the articles Montague wrote during the
period in question.
The articles to which we shall especially direct our attention are: Prag-
matics[1]; Pragmatics and Intensional Logic[2]; On the Nature of Certain
Philosophical Entities [3]; English as a Formal Language [4]; Universal
Grammar [5]; and The Proper Treatment of Quantication in Ordinary
English[7]. Needless to say, but many of the ideas and insights developed in
these papers Montague shared with other philosophers and logicians, some
of whom were his own students at the times in question. Montague himself
was meticulous in crediting others where credit was due, but for convenience
we shall avoid duplicating such references here.
1 Constructed Versus Natural Languages
In his earlier pre-1964 phase of philosophical development Montague thought
a formalization of English or any of natural language was either impossible or
extremely laborious and not rewarding ([10], p. 10). In his view there was an
important di¤erence between constructing a formal language for the purpose
of analyzing concepts that were of interest to philosophers and investigating
the behavior of the expressions in natural language that were ordinarily used
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to express those concepts. He held in low esteem the general methodology
of so-called ordinary-language philosophers that was very popular during
the 1950s and early 60s and thought that there was little or no philosophic
interest in attempting to analyze ordinary language itself.
At the height of his later post-1964 phase of development, Montague
had come to completely reject the contention that an important theoretical
di¤erence exists between formal and natural languages ([4], p. 188), i.e.,
between natural language and the articial languages of logicians([5], p.
222); and he set about constructing a formal language that may be rea-
sonably regarded as a fragment of ordinary English([4], p. 188). He still
rejected the methodology of ordinary-language philosophy but had by then
come to believe that indeed there is philosophic interest in attempting to
analyze ordinary language after all ([3], p. 186).
Nevertheless, despite this important change in view and attitude regard-
ing natural language, Montague continued to maintain that ordinary lan-
guage is an inadequate vehicle for philosophy([3], p. 186). This is partly
because ordinary language is rich in ambiguities and needs to be disam-
biguated and partly because the semantical relation of logical consequence
and logical truth cannot be characterized except with respect to a logically
perspicuous language. It is also, and perhaps more especially, because of
the dubious ontological nature and status of entities purportedly involved
in the use of ordinary language, at least when compared to the entities to
which they are reduced in the logically perspicuous language Montague con-
structs for the semantics of ordinary language. Indeed, here in the ontology
of that logically perspicuous language we nd another, and perhaps more
fundamental, change or development in Montagues philosophy of language.
2 Set Theory Versus Intensional Logic
In his earlier phase, Montague had maintained that philosophy had as its
proper theoretical framework set theory with individuals and the possible
addition of empirical predicates ([3], p. 154). Philosophical analyses, on
this view, were to be carried out within denitional extensions of a set the-
ory so supplemented; and, in consequence, nonextensional entities such as
individual concepts, properties, relations-in-intension and propositions were
not allowed to occur in such analyses. Intensional contexts and so-called
propositional attitudes, such as knowledge and belief, were to be analyzed
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instead in terms of relations between persons and sentences or other similar
expressions. Montagues own contributions to such analyses (and reprinted in
Formal Philosophy) can be found in [8], [9], [7]. This last paper is especially
important for its extension of Tarskis theorem to necessity, or necessary
truth, as a property of sentences.
In his later phase, however, Montague developed a new theoretical frame-
work that transcended set theory and in which individual concepts, prop-
erties, relations-in-in tension, and propositions are all allowed to occur in
philosophical analyses and are found to be not much more mysterious than
sets([3], p. 152). Philosophy, Montague wrote at the mid-point of this
later phase, is always capable of enlarging itself; that is, by metamathemat-
ical or model-theoretic means means available within set theory one can
justifya language or theory that transcends set theory, and then proceed
to transact a new branch of philosophy within the new language(ibid., p.
I55). This new theoretical framework was intensional logic.
There are two stages and two systems involved in Montagues develop-
ment of his new theoretical framework for philosophy. The rst is a second-
order modal logic (which is readily extendible to third and higher-order modal
logic), and the second is an extension of Alonzo Churchs formulation of type
theory in which primitive operators for the extension-intension, or sense-
denotation, distinction have been introduced. The rst, for the most part,
allows only for intuitive translations into logical notation (as typied by the
symbolizations found in elementary logic texts) and usually requires the use
of circumlocution or paraphrase for the representation of certain intensional
verbs such as seek, conceive, owe, etc. The second, on the other hand,
allows for a precise translation of ordinary language and for a direct represen-
tation of intensional verbs. (See Gallin [11] for a description of both systems,
together with other related systems and a number of proofs of results re-
garding all of these systems and their interrelationships.) Before turning
to these systems, however, we shall rst take up Montagues development
of pragmatics, which involves only rst-order languages and which in fact
rather appropriately characterizes the initial phase in the development of
Montagues new orientation to the form and content of language.
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3 Pragmatics and Logical Semiotics
Prior to the 1960s most formal language philosophers deliberately avoided
the question of how the di¤erent contexts in which language is used a¤ects
the meaning and reference of expressions. Logicians, with their proper con-
cern for rigor and formal precision, tended to see the logical analysis of those
features of ordinary language that were dependent on context as either im-
possible or hopelessly complex. They preferred instead to abstract from par-
ticular contexts of use and to provide analyses of sentences and arguments
of ordinary language within a timeless and context-free setting.
Logical semiotics at that time, as opposed to descriptive semiotics, was
in fact by denition restricted to logical (or pure) syntax (concatenation the-
ory) and logical (or pure) semantics (model-theory as a branch of set-theory
or as a form of higher-order logic), where the latter amounted in e¤ect only
to a theory of reference. Pragmatics, the third branch of the semiotic trin-
ity, was not only excluded from logical or pure semiotics on this scheme,
but was in fact considered to be the very basis of descriptive semiotics (Cf.
Carnap [12] ). Thus, for example, Rudolf Capnap considered pragmatics to
be an empirical theory that was to be formulated in the metalanguage of a
collection of languages, and in that regard was to be concerned with the rela-
tionship between the users and the signs of the object languages in question.
The expressions of a pragmatic theory, on this view, including epistemic ex-
pressions for belief, doubt, etc., were considered to be predicates belonging
to the metalanguage that were understood as designating psychological re-
lations between language users and signs of the object languages. Indeed,
Carnap clearly states even as late as 1963 that the relation of designation in
pragmatics is a psychological concept(cf. Carnap [13]).
Montagues development of pragmatics was not so much a rejection of
this tradition as an alternative development within logical semiotics. What
he proposed was an extension of the semantical notion of truth (in a model or
interpretation) as dened for standard rst-order languages but now supple-
mented with pragmatic operators, such as operators for the past and future
tenses, as well as other indexical expressions for demonstratives and personal
pronouns. Pragmatics, according to Montague, is to follow the lead of seman-
tics and concern itself also with the notion of truth but with respect not
only to an interpretation but also a context of use([1], p. 96). Thus instead
of dealing with descriptive pragmatic predicates of an empirical metalinguis-
tic theory, Montague formulates a logical theory of rst-order languages that
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include pragmatic operators and certain individual constants taken to repre-
sent the demonstratives and personal pronouns of natural language.
4 Pragmatic Languages
On Montagues approach then, a pragmatic language is a rst-order language
the basic symbols of which are drawn from the following categories: (1) logical
constants, e.g., :, ^, _, !, $, 8, 9 and = (with their usual readings); (2)
auxiliary symbols such as parentheses, brackets and commas; (3) individual
variables; (4) individual constants; (5) n-place predicate constants (for n 2
!), including the one-place predicate constant E(for exists); and (6) n-
place operators, for n 2 !   f0g. The terms and formulas of a pragmatic
language L are built up in the usual way except that now whenever M is
an n-place operator of L and '1; :::; 'n are formulas of L, then
pM'1:::'
q
n is
also a formula of L. Thus, e.g., where P and F are one-place operators (for
the past and future tense) and ' is a formula, then pP'q and pF'q are also
formulas and may be read as pIt was the case that 'q and pIt will be the case
that 'q, respectively.
In interpreting a pragmatic language, it is of course necessary that we
take into account the possible contexts of use for that language. We need
not consider these contexts in their full complexity, on the other hand, but
need only consider those aspects of such a context that are relevant to the
language in question. Montague calls such a complex of relevant aspects
an index or, following Dana Scott, a point of reference. Thus for the tense
operators each index will specify a moment of time, and for personal pronouns
and demonstratives it will also specify speaker, a listener, objects indicated,
etc.
Besides the indices or points of reference, an interpretation for a pragmatic
language L will assign intensions (or meanings) to each of the operators and
individual and predicate constants in L. The idea here is that an intension
determines an extension of the relevant type in each context of use, i.e., at
each index of a possible pragmatic interpretation. Intensions, or rather their
set-theoretic representations, accordingly, can be identied with certain func-
tions on the set of indices. Thus, e.g., the intension of an individual constant
will be a function that assigns an individual to each index; and the inten-
sion of an n-place predicate constant will be a function that assigns a set of
n-tuples of individuals, i.e., an n-ary relation (in extension) between individ-
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uals to each index. Montague called the rst type of intension an individual
concept and the second an n-ary relation-in-intension (between individu-
als). The intension of a one-place predicate constant he called a property
(of individuals). Rudolf Carnap was the originator of this general type of
approach to the set-theoretic representation of intensions. Carnap, however,
as Montague noted, restricted his indices to models or state-descriptions.
Where Montague went beyond Carnap, aside from his disassociating in-
dices from models or state-descriptions, was in his unied treatment of prag-
matic operators and in that regard in his development of a general prag-
matic logic. In order to understand this treatment, let us note rst that as
an intension a proposition determines a truth-value in each context of use,
and therefore at each index of a pragmatic interpretation. In this regard,
the same proposition can be set-theoretically represented either by the set of
indices (of the interpretation) at which it is true or by the function that as-
signs to each index the truth-value the proposition determines at that index.
Relative to the former representation, the functions on indices that Mon-
tague associates with n-place operators are those that assign to each index
an n-ary relation (in extension) between the propositions of the interpreta-
tion, i.e., those that assign to each index an n-ary relation on the set of all
subsets of the set of indices of the interpretation. In other words, because
the di¤erent subsets of indices are here taken as set-theoretic representatives
of propositions, pragmatic operators were interpreted by Montague in e¤ect
as higher-order properties and relations-in-intension of propositions.
Formally stated, then, a possible interpretation for a pragmatic language
L is an ordered triple hI; U; F i such that (1) I and U are the sets of indices and
individuals, respectively, of the interpretation; (2) F is a function dened on
the set of operators and individual and predicate constants in L; (3) for each
individual constant c in L, F (c) 2 U I ; (4) for each n-plane predicate constant
P in L, F (P) 2 fA : A  UngI ; and (5) for each n-place operator M in L,
F (M) is a function on I such that for each i 2 I, F (M)(i)  fJ : J  Ign.
Where A is a possible interpretation for a pragmatic language L, the fact
that each nonlogical constant in L is assigned an intension in A allows us
to follow the recursion clauses in the denition of the terms and formulas of
L in such a way as to assign a unique intension of the appropriate type to
each term and formula of L. This then leads in a natural and obvious way
to a denition of truth for the sentences of L at an index of A, and thereby
to denitions of logical truth and logical consequence in the sense of general
pragmatics. (We shall forgo the details of these denitions here, however.)
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Now it should be noted that particular pragmatic languages, such as those
for modal, deontic and tense logic, had of course been studied before, both
by Montague and his students as well as by other logicians. But in each
case, as Montague observed, truth and satisfaction had to be dened anew,
because no unied treatment of operators had yet been realized ([2], p.
120). Indeed, it is in fact Montagues unied treatment of the semantics of
operators that is his unique contribution to the development of pragmatics
within logical semiotics. In particular, it is only with respect to such a
unied treatment that the notions of logical truth and logical consequence
in the sense of general pragmatics can be characterized at all.
Notwithstanding this development of pragmatics within logical semiotics,
however, philosophers are typically not interested in general pragmatic logic
but in certain specializations or disciplines, such as the tense, modal and
deontic logics already mentioned. Such specializations or disciplines, relative
to general pragmatic logic, amount to restricting the possible interpretations
to certain classes of what might be considered the standard interpretations
for the discipline in question. Thus where K is such a class of possible
interpretations, we can restrict logical truth and logical consequence in the
sense of general pragmatic logic to the interpretations inK, giving us instead,
e.g., K-validity and K-consequence. Sometimes it will even be necessary
to restrict the indices as well, designating some of them as the standard
points of reference; and this will lead to further restrictions on validity and
consequence, all serving the particular discipline in question (cf. [1], pp.
104f.).
5 Intensional Logic as Higher-Order Modal
Logic
It is noteworthy that although the nonlogical constants of a pragmatic lan-
guage are all assigned intensions in a possible interpretation for that lan-
guage, the only entities quanticationally referred to under such an inter-
pretation are the individuals of the interpretation. Pragmatic languages are
after all rst-order languages, and in that regard, what is indicated by the
fact that pragmatic operators can be interpreted as higher-order properties
and relations-in-intension of propositions is that pragmatic languages amount
in e¤ect to rst-order reductions of (a part of) higher-order intensional lan-
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guages, i.e., higher-order languages where the properties and relations-in-
intension between propositions that operators in pragmatic languages repre-
sent are directly represented instead by higher-order predicate constants.
Alternatively, what this also indicates is that pragmatics, as a develop-
ment within logical semiotics, might more appropriately be viewed as con-
tained in intensional logic where quanticational reference to the intensional
entities represented in pragmatic interpretations is a part of the object lan-
guage itself. Indeed, according to Montague, the fact that the modalities
that have usually been associated with operators coincide in a sense with
properties and relations-in-intension of propositions is what lends interest
to those modalities and provides intuitive sanction for using them to inter-
pret operators ([2], p. 137). And if that is the case, then we might just
as well develop an intensional logic and proceed to do philosophy in that
framework instead. This in fact is what Montague had gone on to do next
in his developing new orientation to the philosophy of language.
Montagues rst formulation of an intensional logic is really a second-order
modal logic supplemented with third-order predicate constants. An inten-
sional language on this formulation is one the basic symbols of which are (1)
the logical constants of pragmatic languages; (2) parentheses and brackets;
(3) individual variables and constants; (4) n-place predicate variables, for
n 2 !; (5) the one-place operator  (read necessarily); (6) the descriptive
symbol T (read the unique ... such that); and predicate constants of type
s, for each nite sequence s of integers   1.
The type of a predicate constant, as described above, indicates the gram-
matical types of the argument-expressions it takes, with  1 being the type
of an individual variable or constant and a nonnegative integer n being the
type of an n-place predicate variable. We identify propositional variables and
propositional constants here with 0-place predicate variables and predicate
constants of type s, where s is the null sequence.
The atomic formulas of an intensional language L are expressions either of
the form p = q, where ,  are individual variables or constants; pP = Qq,
where P, Q are n-place predicate variables, for n 2 !; pP(1; :::; n)q, where
P is an n-place predicate variable and each  i is either an individual variable
or an individual constant; or pR(1; :::; k)
q, where R is a predicate constant
of type hs1; :::; ski and either s1 =  1 and i is an individual variable or
constant or si  0 and i is an si-place predicate variable.
Given the atomic formulas, the formulas of L are then built up in the
obvious way. The descriptive symbol T, however, is allowed to apply only to
8
predicate variables, so that where P is an n-place predicate variable and '
is a formula, pTP'q is a complex n-place predicate expression. As used by
Montague, these descriptive phrases are all eliminable and therefore, strictly
speaking, the descriptive symbol T need not occur at all in the formulas of
intensional logic. Its utility is really one of convenience for allowing certain
more direct ways for representing complexly described intensions.
Because the set-theoretic counterparts or representatives of intensions
are always functions on some set I of indices and with values that are either
drawn or constructed from a set U of individuals, it is more accurate in
some contexts if we speak of these counterparts as hI; Ui-intensions. Thus
an hI; Ui-individual concept is a function on I with values in U ; and an
n-ary hI; Ui-relation-in-intension is a function on I with n-ary relations (in
extension) on U , i.e., sets of n-tuples drawn from U , as values. An hI; Ui-
property is a one-ary hI; Ui-relation-in-intension.
An hI; Ui-proposition, as already noted, can be identied either with a
subset of I, namely, the set of indices at which the proposition is true, or with
a function that assigns a truth-value to each index. If we use 1 to represent the
true and 0 to represent the false, then an hI; Ui-proposition, as a function that
assigns a truth-value to each index, amounts to the characteristic function
of the set of indices at which the proposition is true, i.e., it amounts to that
function on I with values in f0; 1g such that 1 is assigned to all and only those
indices in the set in question. This latter identication is more convenient
in our present context since we identify 0 with both the null sequence and
the empty set and take 1 = f0g. Thus, because propositional variables are
construed here as 0-place predicate variables, an hI; Ui-proposition which is
the value of such a variable will be an hI; Ui-intension that has 0 or 1 as its
value (extension) at each index. An hI; Ui-proposition, in other words, is a
0-ary hI; Ui-relation-in-intension.
A possible interpretation for an intensional language L, then, is a triple
hI; U; F i such that (1) I and U are the sets of indices and individuals, re-
spectively, of the interpretation; (2) F is a function dened on the nonlogical
constants of L, i.e., the single operator  and the individual and predicate
constants in L; (3) for each individual constant c in L, F (c) 2 U I , i.e., F (c)
is an hI; Ui-individual concept; (4) F () = fhi; hIii : i 2 Ig, i.e. F () is
that property that propositions (as subsets of I) have when and only when
they are true at every index1; and (5) for each predicate constant P of type
1Our interpretation here of  as a one-place operator that is directly to be assigned an
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hs1; :::; ski in L, F (P) is a function on I such that for j 2 I, F (P)(j) is a set
of n-tuples (V1; :::; Vk) such that for all i, if 1  i  _k, than either si =  1
and Vi 2 U or si  0 and Vi is an si-ary hI; Ui-relation-in-intension.
As with pragmatic languages, we are able again to follow the recursion
clauses for the construction of an arbitrary formula of an intensional language
L and dene, relative to a possible interpretation A for L, the intension in
A of each formula of L; and, as before, this denition also leads in a natural
way to a denition of truth (for the sentences of L) at an index of A, and
thereby to denitions of logical truth and logical consequence (in the sense of
intensional logic).
With the syntax and semantics of intensional languages characterized
as above, the exact sense in which pragmatics is contained in intensional
logic can now be explained as follows. For each pragmatic language L,
there is (easily constructible from L) an intensional language L0 contain-
ing (1) all the individual constants of L; (2) a predicate constant P0 of type
hs1; :::; sni, where si =  1, for i  n, for each n-place predicate constant
P in L; and (3) a predicate constant M0 of type hs1; :::; smi, where si = 0,
for i  m, for each m-place operator M in L. Similarly, for each pragmatic
interpretation hI; U; F i for L there is an intensional interpretation hI; U; F 0i
for L0 such that (1) F 0(c) = F (c) for each individual constant c in L; (2)
F 0(P0) = F (P) for each n-place predicate constant P in L; and (3) for each
m-place operator M in L, F 0(M0) is that function on I such that for i 2 I,
F 0(M0)(i) = fhcf(J1); :::; cf(Jm)i : hJ1; :::; Jmi 2 F (M)(i)g , where cf(Jk) is
the characteristic function of Jk, for k  m.
A translation function t that translates each formula of L into a for-
mula of L0 can be recursively dened as follows: t(p& = q) = p& =
q; t(pP(&1; :::; &n)q = pP0(&1; :::; &n)q; t(p:'q) = :t('); and similarly for
^, _, !, $; t(p8vi'q) = p8vit(')q, and similarly for p9vi'q; and -
nally t(pM 1::: 
q
m) = 9p1:::9pm[[p1 $ t( 1)] ^ ::: ^ [pm $ t( m)] ^
M0(p1; :::;pm)]. It is now easily proved that if ' is a sentence of L and i 2 I,
then ' is true at i in the pragmatic interpretation hI; U; F i if and only if t(')
is true at i in the intensional interpretation (hI; U; F 0i.
intension under an interpretation is an inessential modication of Montagues treatment.
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6 Philosophical Applications of Intensional Logic
In turning to philosophical applications of his intensional logic, Montague
took up such questions as whether we need tolerate such entities as pains,
events, tasks and obligations([3], p. 148). Sentences in which we purport-
edly talk about these entities play a conspicuous role in philosophy, percep-
tual psychology, and everyday discourse (ibid.); and it therefore appears
desirable to investigate the nature of the entities in question, construct an
exact and convenient language in which to speak of them, and analyze the
pertinent notion of logical consequence(ibid.). It is this last task in partic-
ular that, according to Montague, is a necessary preliminary to the rational
treatment of certain philosophical paradoxes(ibid., p. 149).
Of course, if the entities in question can be reduced to the properties and
relations-in-in tension of intensional logic, then this last task has in fact al-
ready been accomplished; and it is not surprising, therefore, to nd Montague
proposing just such a reduction. Thus, e.g., insofar as it is not unreasonable
to regard an (instantaneous generic) event of the suns rising as correspond-
ing to the expression the sun rises at t, it is similarly not unreasonable,
according to Montague, to identify the (generic) event in question with the
property expressed by that expression. Instantaneous generic events, on this
analysis, will form a certain class of properties of moments of time(ibid., p.
150); and the occurrence of such an event at a moment is to be explicated as
the possession by that moment of the property that is identied with that
event. Protracted generic events can of course be identied with properties
of intervals, rather than of just moments, of time.
Tasks, according to Montague, should be regarded as certain two-place
relations-in-intension between persons and moments (ibid., p. 151); and
therefore the performance of a task R by a person x at a moment t is to
be taken as xs bearing the relation-in-intension R to t. Pains, and more
generally experiences, are of the same ontological sort as tasks: they form a
certain class of relations-in-intension between persons and moments(ibid.).
Thus, for example, the experience of seeing a tree is the relation-in-intension
born by x to t just in case x sees a tree at t(ibid.); and therefore for x to
have the experience R at t is for x to bear the relation-in-intension R to
t. Finally, obligations, according to Montague, can also best be regarded
as the same sort of thing as tasks and experiences, that is, as relations-in-
intension between persons and moments(ibid.); and therefore for a person
x to discharge or fulll an obligation R at a moment t is again for x to bear
11
the relation-in-intension R to t.
One point to be noted in these reductions is that on Montagues view the
basic notion of partaking of a property ... is expressed in ordinary English
by several di¤erent verbs, depending on context; by perform in the case
of a task, have in the case of an experience, and occur in the case of
an event (ibid.); and of course by discharge or fulll in the case of an
obligation. It should also be noted, however, that in none of these reductions
does Montague claim to have dened the notion of an experience, or of a
task, etc. What he does claim is that the property of being an experience,
of being a task, etc., is to be regarded as a property of relations-in-intension
between persons and moments.
The reduction of these dubious ontological categories to one, namely
that of relations-in-intension, led Montague to place more emphasis on the
ontological status of the indices and individuals involved in the set-theoretic
construction of relations-in-intension. Instead of being merely possible con-
texts of use, indices are now spoken of as full-edged possible worlds and
the individuals are all the di¤erent possibilia that might exist in those dif-
ferent possible worlds. There is, however, some question here as to whether
the notions of a possible world and of a possible individual have an absolute
or only a relative status in the set-theoretic foundations of Montagues new
theoretical framework; and we shall return to this question at a later point
in this essay.
The important observation that should be made here in any case is that
by reducing these dubious ontological categories to that of relations-in-
intension, Montague had in e¤ect produced an exact language capable of
naturally accommodating discourse about the dubious entities as well as
dened an intuitively satisfactory notion of logical consequence for the sen-
tences of that language(ibid., p. 154); and in consequence we have at least
the necessary preliminaries for a rational treatment of a variety of philosoph-
ical puzzles or paradoxes.
Toward the treatment of such puzzles in the present version of inten-
sional logic, Montague utilizes the modal operator as a means for construct-
ing names of specic relations-in-intension. Thus, adopting the following
abbreviatory notation:
v^1:::v^n' =df TP8v1:::8vn[P(v1; :::;vn)$ ']
we can read pv^1:::v^n'q as pthe relation-in-intension between those (possible)
individuals v1; :::;vn such that 'q. If n = 1, then pv^1'q designates the prop-
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erty of those individuals that satisfy ' (as values of the individual variable
v1and for n = 0, we use p^'qfor pthe proposition expressed by 'q.
In general, at least when the formula in question is not too complex, Mon-
tague identies pv^1'q and pv^1v^2'q with the use of innitives and gerunds in
English. E.g., where Baldis a predicate constant of type h 1i, pv^1Bald(v1)q
represents the di¤erent English expressions, to be bald, being baldand the
property of being bald. The last expression is of course also represented by
the predicate constant Balditself so that
Bald = v^1Bald(v1)
is taken here to be logically true; and in fact it is an instance of the more
general logical truth:
(1) 8P[P = u^P(u)]
It is important to note here, however, that (1) cannot be instantiated to
just any predicate expression and still result in a logical truth. E.g., suppose
we restricted ourselves to the present moment and took experiences, tasks,
etc., to be (relational) properties that a person may or may not now possess;
and suppose that a certain person, Jones, is now having the experience of
seeing a tree, although in some other possible world the same person, Jones,
is having a completely di¤erent experience. Clearly, there is nothing incon-
sistent in this situation; and the assumption that (the property of) seeing a
tree is an experience and that it is in fact the experience that Jones is now
having can be plausibly represented by:
(2) Experience(u^[u sees a tree]
(3) TP[Experience(P) ^P(Jones)] = u^[u sees a tree]
Moreover, the (modal) fact that Jones is not seeing a tree in some other
possible world but is having some completely di¤erent experience in that
world indicates that the property of having the experience that Jones is
having is not identical with the property of seeing a tree, i.e., that
(4) u^[TP[Experience(P) ^P(Jones)](u)] 6= u^[u sees a tree]
is also true in the situation described because otherwise the two properties
designated in (4) would have the same extension in every possible world,
which is contrary to assumption.
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As Montague points out, it is fallacious to attempt to derive a contradic-
tion here by claiming that
TP[Experience(P)^P(Jones)] = u^[TP[Experience(P) ^P(Jones)](u)]
follows from (1) by universal instantiation, and that therefore, by (3) and
Euclids law that things equal to the same thing are equal to one another,
u^[TP[Experience(P) ^P(Jones)](u)] = u^[u sees a tree)
is true after all. For the fact is that the variable P occurs in (1) within the
scope of the modal operator; and in consequence (1) can be instantiated only
to those predicate expressions that (rigidly) designate the same property in
every possible world, whereas of course pTP[Experience(P) ^P(Jones)q,
by assumption, does not designate the same property in every possible world.
Thus, while the experience that Jones is having is indeed a property, it is
nevertheless not the property of having the experience that Jones is having.
Another example to which Montague applies his intensional logic is in the
analysis of:
Jones sees a unicorn having the same height as a table actually before him.
which according at least to some philosophers implies the existence of sense
data. Here Montague takes sees in its veridical sense and interprets its
nonveridical sense as seems to see, where seems is taken as a predicate
constant of type h 1; 1; 1i, as in x seems to y to see a unicorn, i.e., as in
pSeems(x;y; u^[9z(Unicorn(z) ^ Sees(u; z))]). Montagues analysis of (6)
then is as follows:
9x[Table(x) ^Before(x;Jones) ^ Seems(Jones;Jones; (7)
u^[9y(Unicorn(y) ^ Sees(u;y) ^Has-the-same-height-as(y;x))])]
Note that no sense data are required on this analysis, so that an argument
for the existence of sense data based on (6) must be deemed inconclusive (see
[3], p. 171).
Circumlocutions, such as seems to seefor the nonveridical sense of sees,
are rather common in philosophical analyses and are in general based on the
assumption that opaque contexts in ordinary language, such as that of the
direct-object position in the nonveridical sense of sees, are always to be
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analyzed by means of a paraphrase in which a sentence or formula occurs
within the scope of a modal operator. It is the occurrence of a full sentence
or formula within the scope of a modal operator, in other words, that explains
on this assumption why, e.g., existential generalization or the substitutivity
of identity fails for opaque contexts. Thus, e.g., while x sees a unicorncan
be represented by
Seems(x;x; u^[9y(Unicom(y) ^ Sees(u;y))])
when seesis taken in its nonveridical sense; and in the latter analysis the
formula p9y(Unicorn(y) ^ Sees(u;y)q occurs within the scope of a modal
operator (which is implicit in the denition of pu^[:::]q), so that nothing follows
about the existence of a unicorn that only seems to be seen.
As another example of the apparent need for circumlocution, consider
the verb seek, which also generates an opaque context with respect to its
direct-object position. When compared with the verb nd, what we notice
is that while
Jones nds a unicorn; therefore, there is a unicorn.
is valid, the apparently similar argument:
Jones seeks a unicorn; therefore, there is a unicorn.
is invalid;2 and this amounts to a philosophical puzzle insofar as we need to
explain how of two arguments of apparently the same logical form one can
be valid and the other invalid.
Relative to the present version of intensional logic, Montagues own ap-
proach to this example is to regard tries to ndas a circumlocution for
seeks, where the verb triesis represented by a predicate constant of type
h 1; 1i. The above argument is then analyzed by Montague as follows:
Tries(Jones; u^[9y(Unicorn(y) ^ Finds(u;y))]); therefore; 9yUnicorn(y):
2Strictly speaking, Jones seeks a unicornis ambiguous between a de re (referential)
reading and a de dicto (nonreferential) reading. Such ambiguity is typical of intensional
verbs. The de re reading is unambiguously given by Jones seeks a certain unicorn, from
which, as premise, it does follow that there is a unicorn. We are of course understanding
the sentence in the text to be given with its de dicto reading, from which it does not follow
that there is a unicorn.
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which of course is completely di¤erent in logical form from:
9y(Unicorn(y) ^ Finds(Jones;y)); therefore; 9yUnicorn(y):
Thus, upon analysis through circumlocution and paraphrase, the two argu-
ments are seen to have signicantly di¤erent logical forms after all, so that
the validity of the one need not, and in fact does not, carry over to the other.
Despite his use of circumlocution and paraphrase in a number of analyses,
Montague nevertheless came to reject the general assumption that opacity
is always to be accounted for by the occurrence in ordinary language of a
sentence or formula within the scope of a modal operator and that therefore
sentences containing intensional verbs, such as seek, conceive, worship,
etc., that do not involve such an occurrence of a sentence or formula are
to be paraphrased into sentences that do. This is because, for Montague,
opacity is but an aspect of intensionality, which is present in the semantics
of a number of transitive verbs. It is an aspect, however, that cannot be
represented in the present formulation of intensional logic without resorting
to circumlocution though, as we shall see, it can be represented without
circumlocution and paraphrase in Montagues second and later development
of intensional logic.
7 Intensional Logic Based on the Sense-
Denotation Distinction
It is noteworthy that the only entities explicitly acknowledged in Montagues
rst version of intensional logic, i.e., entities to which quanticational ref-
erence can be made in the object language itself, are possible individuals
and, for each n 2 !, n-ary relations-in-intension, where the latter include
propositions (for n = 0) and properties (for n = 1). The apparently ex-
cluded ontological categories of individual concepts and (n-ary) relations-in-
extension, it turns out, are directly reducible to relations-in-intension. E.g.,
as an hI; Ui-intension, we have identied an individual concept with a func-
tion f from I into U ; and therefore the same individual concept can equally
well be identied with a function f 0 from I into singleton subsets of U , where
f 0(i) = ff(i)g , for each i 2 I. Thus, we can identify individual concepts with
those properties satisfying the following formula (as values of the one-place
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predicate variable P ) (cf. [2], p. 132):
9u8v[P(v)$ v = u]:
An n-ary relation-in-extension, on the other hand, can be identied with
an n-ary relation-in-intension that has the same extension, namely the relation-
in-extension in question, at every index. Thus, we can identify n-ary relations-
in-extension with those n-ary relations-in-intension that satisfy the following
formula (as values of the n-place predicate variable P) (ibid.):
8v1; :::8vn[P(v1; :::;vn) _:P(v1; :::;vn)]:
Having made these reductions, one might well maintain that the distinc-
tion between the intension and extension, or the sense and denotation, of
an expression is neither fundamental to intensional logic and therefore not
a basic distinction for philosophical analysis nor necessary, as apparently
Gottlob Frege thought, for the analysis of ordinary language. One might well
speak, accordingly, of the denotation simpliciter of individual and predicate
expressions, even though the denotations of the latter would in this case be
what others call their senses. Indeed, in [4], Montague explicitly endorsed
and carried through just such a view in his semantics for a fragment of or-
dinary English. It is wrong to maintain, Montague argued there, that an
analysis of ordinary English (or German) requires a notion of sense as well
as one of denotation(p. 217).
In [5], on the other hand, Montague withdrew his emphasis on the pos-
sibility of doing without a distinction between sense and denotation; and
he claimed that while such a distinction can be avoided in special cases, it
remains necessary for the general theory, and probably provides the clearest
approach even to the special cases in question(p. 222). And having changed
his view on this matter, Montague proceeded to formulate his second version
of intensional logic in which the distinction between sense and denotation
was then taken as fundamental.
The ontological framework of this new intensional logic is based on a type-
theoretical distinction regarding the various entities that are to be explicitly
acknowledged in the logic, i.e., the entities to which quanticational reference
is to be meaningful; and, in e¤ect, a theory of types that is essentially an
extension of Alonzo Churchs theory of simple types. To set-theoretically
characterize the types, let e, t, s be three objects, none of which is an ordered
pair; and let Type, the set of types, be inductively dened as the smallest
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set such that (1) e; t 2 Type; (2) ha; bi 2 Type whenever a; b 2 Type; and
hs; ai 2 Type whenever a 2 Type.
Entities of type e are understood to be the possible individuals of inten-
sional logic, while entities of type t are the two truth-values. An entity of
type ha; bi is a function from entities of type a to entities of type b; and there-
fore entities of type ha; ti are the characteristic functions of sets of entities
of type a, all of which we will hereafter speak of as being those sets them-
selves; i.e., we will not distinguish here between a set and its characteristic
function. Also, we will not distinguish here between an n-ary relation-in-
extension between entities of type a1; :::; am, respectively, and the function of
type ha1; ha2:::; han; tii:::ii. E.g., a set of individuals and a binary relation-
in-extension between individuals are construed here as entities of types he; ti
and he; he; tii, respectively.
Finally, where a 2 Type, the sense, or intension, or an entity of type a is
an entity of type hs; ai; and thus senses, or intensions, as can be seen from
the denition of Type, are always senses of an entity of some type, i.e., there
are no entities of type s simpliciter. Senses, or intensions, of sets of entities
of type a, i.e., senses of type hs; ha; tii are understood in this framework to be
the properties of entities of type a; and senses of n-ary relations-in-extension
between entities of type a1; :::; an, are understood to be the n-ary relations-
in-intension between entities of these types. Propositions, moreover, are
understood to be the senses of type hs; ti.
In regard to the syntax of intensional logic, the only primitive syncate-
gorematic signs, besides parentheses and brackets, that Montague adopts are
=, the identity sign; , Churchs function-forming -abstraction operator;
and ^ and
_
, the intension-forming and extension-forming operators. (Here
we see already how fundamental the intension-extension, or sense-denotation,
distinction is on this version of intensional logic.) We also assume, for each
a 2 Type, the availability of denumerably many variables of type a as well as
of denumerably many constants of type a. The set of meaningful expressions
of type a, MEa, is recursively dened (on the set of types) as follows:
1. every variable and constant of type a is in MEa;
2. if  2MEha;bi and  2MEa, then p()q 2MEb;
3. if  2MEa and u is a variable of type b, then puq 2MEhb;ai;
4. if ; 2MEa, then pa = q 2MEt;
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5. if  2MEa, then p^q 2MEhs;ai;
6. if  2MEhs;ai, thenp_ 2MEa.
The logical constants of the earlier version of intensional logic can now of
course be taken as dened rather than as primitive constants. E.g., where
a 2 Type,  is the rst variable of type a, p is a variable of type t,  is a
variable of type ht; ti, and '; are formulas, i.e., '; 2MEt:
8' =df' = [a = a]
:' =df' = 8pp
' ^ =df8( = [(') = ( )])
The necessity operator and our earlier formal counterpart for innitive con-
structions are denable here as follows, where ' is a formula,  is a variable
of arbitrary type a and u is a variable of type e:
' =df [^' =^8u(u = u)]
^' =df [^']
It should also be noted here that if a 2 type,  2MEa and  2MEha;ti,
i.e., if  is of the type of a set of entities of type a, then p()q expresses the
membershipof the entity denoted by  in the set denoted by . On the
other hand, if  2MEhs;ha;tii instead, i.e., if  is of the type of a property of
entities of type a, then we use:
fag =df [
_
]():
to express the possessionby the entity denoted by of the property denoted
by .
In constructing a set-theoretic semantics for the present version of inten-
sional logic, we again need to regard certain sets I and U as being the set
of possible worlds and the set of possible individuals, respectively. Where
a 2 Type, the set of possible denotations (or values of variables) of type a as
based on U and I, in symbolsDa;U;I , is dened recursively as follows:
1. De;U;I = U ;
2. Dt;U;I = f0; 1g;
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3. if a; b 2 Type, Dha;bi;U;I = (Db;U;I)Da;U;I ;
4. if a 2 Type, Dhs;ai;U;I = (Da;U;I)I .
In addition to the set of possible worlds I, Montague wants us to also
consider a set J of contexts of use in the possible worlds in I. The indices
or points of reference now are neither possible worlds alone nor contexts of
use alone but are rather ordered pairs of each, i.e., a reference point is a pair
hi; ji, where i 2 I and j 2 J . It should be noted, however, that Montague
now takes moments, when they are needed in the interpretation of tenses,
to be components of members of I rather than components of members of J
(cf. [5], p. 228).
Relative to the sets U , I, J , and a type a, Montague takes the set of pos-
sible meanings of type a, in symbolsMa;U;I;J , to be functions from the points
of reference into possible denotations of type a, i.e., Ma;U;I;J = (Da;U;I)IJ .
Meanings, on this interpretation, are functions of two arguments: a possi-
ble world and a context of use. Senses, or intensions, on the other hand,
are functions of only one argument, namely, a possible world (which may
include specication of a moment of time). It should be noted, however, that
only senses, and not meanings, are explicitly acknowledged in the ontological
framework of the theory, i.e., it is senses, and not meanings, that can be
quanticationally referred to within the logic itself. Meanings, rather than
senses, are needed to serve as the interpretations of expressions, on the other
hand, because the interpretation of a compound is always to be a function
of the interpretation of its components, including of course indexical compo-
nents such as pronouns and demonstratives; and functions on possible worlds
alone will not always su¢ ce to satisfy this condition.
An interpretation for the present version of intensional logic, accordingly,
can be taken to be a 4-tuple hI; J; U; F i, where (1) I; J; U are nonempty sets
representing respectively, the possible worlds, the contexts of use, and the
possible individuals of the interpretation; and (2) F is a function dened on
the set of constants such that whenever a 2 Type and  is a constant of
type a, then F () 2 Ma;U;I;J . Naturally, relative to such an interpretation
we can again follow (but shall avoid doing so here) the recursion clauses in
the denition of a meaningful expression of a given type so as to characterize
the meaning each such expression is assigned under the interpretation; and
of course, where a 2 Type, the meaning of an expression of type a will be a
member of Ma;U;I;J .
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Where ' is a sentence, i.e., a member of MEt in which no variable has a
free occurrence, and hi; ji is a point of reference of an interpretation as dened
above, then ' is true at hi; ji (under the interpretation) if the meaning '
has under that interpretation has the value 1 at the reference point hi; ji.
Denitions of logical truth and logical consequence do not immediately follow,
however, because it is possible that under some interpretations some of the
logical constants might not be assigned their standard or usual meanings. We
can of course restrict our considerations to the class of those interpretations
under which all the logical constants do receive their usual meanings and
dene logical truth and logical consequence with respect to this class. We can
also extend this class, however, by including interpretations under which the
logical constants receive their usual or standard extensions of all designated
or standard points of reference but not also at certain other unactualizable
points of reference (cf. [5], p. 231). Sentences that are synonymous, i.e., that
have the same meanings, under all the interpretations in this latter class will
then also be logically equivalent; but then there will also be sentences that
are logically equivalent, i.e., that have the same truth-value at all of the
designated points of reference of all the interpretations in the class, that are
not synonymous under every interpretation in the class.
This divergence between synonymy and logical equivalence, Montague
notes, allows for a natural treatment of belief contexts that lacks the con-
troversial property of always permitting interchange on the basis of logical
equivalence (ibid.). It should also be noted in this regard, however, that
Montagues treatment of belief contexts in his rst version of intensional
logic had in fact possessed this controversial property (cf. [2], pp. 137¤.);
and, indeed, even here in his second version of intensional logic it is not
so much that Montague rejects his earlier analysis as that he wishes only to
point out that that approach has genuine alternatives and is not forced upon
us([15], p. 231).
8 On the Intensional Reality of PossibleWorlds
We have already noted that the only entities to which quanticational refer-
ence can be made in Montagues rst version of intensional logic are possible
individuals and, for each n 2 !, n-ary relations-in-intension. And the situa-
tion is really not that much di¤erent in the new version of intensional logic,
although now quanticational reference to individual concepts (as senses of
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type hs; ei) and relations-in-extension can be e¤ected directly rather than
indirectly through relations-in-intension. The question naturally arises then
as to the status of possible worlds in the ontological framework of intensional
logic. That is, in what sense, if any, does the adoption of intensional logic as
a new theoretical framework for philosophy presuppose the existence or be-
ingof possible worlds? In particular, are possible worlds among the entities
to which quanticational reference can be made within this new theoretical
framework?
Now it may seem natural to maintain that possible worlds have been as-
sumed to exist all along in Montagues set-theoretic semantics for intensional
logic; and, indeed, it is true that Montague even considered adding to the
language of set theory two denite singular terms, one to designate the set
of possible worlds, and the other the set of possible individuals([3], p. 154).
But he also went on in the same context to reject that suggestion; and in
his denition of an interpretation hI; U; F i for an intensional language, or of
an interpretation hI; J; U; F i for intensional logic, we are not told that the
sets I and U are the set of possible worlds and the set of possible individuals
simpliciter but only that they are nonempty sets that are to be regarded as
the set of possible worlds and possible individuals, respectively, of the inter-
pretation in question. And in that sense, the notions of a possible world and
of a possible individual have only a relative, and not an absolute, status from
the ontological point of view.
What would render this notion absolute rather than relative in Mon-
tagues set-theoretic semantics, or at least what would be a necessary con-
dition for such, would be an assumption to the e¤ect that if hI; U; F i and
hI 0; U 0; F 0i are two interpretations for an intensional language L, then I = I 0
and U = U 0. And if Montague had added to the language of set theory
the two special singular terms mentioned above, then he might well indeed
have made just this assumption. But in fact Montague rejected adding such
singular terms and there is no indication at all that he intended to make any
such assumption. Indeed, to the contrary, Montague explicitly said that in-
tensional logic transcends set theory, and that therefore it is not reducible to
set theory even though it can be justiedby metamathematical or model-
theoretic means available within set theory ([3], p. 155).
The question of Montagues commitment to possible worlds, accordingly,
applies not to his set-theoretic semantics but to his adoption of intensional
logic as a new theoretical framework for philosophy. For possible individuals,
the commitment is quite explicit: these are the entities indicated by bound
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individual variables, i.e., variables of type e; and it is clear, moreover, that
whatever else a possible world is within the framework of intensional logic,
it is not an individual, since in that case relations-in-intension would reduce
to relations-in-extension.3
Perhaps the most plausible suggestion is the identication of possible
worlds with certain world propositions, where the notion of a world as a
property of propositions is denable as follows, where p;q are variables of
type hs; ti:
Worldhs;hhs;ti;tii=df p^[
_
p ^ 8q([_p!_q] _[_p!_:q])
A world-proposition is true in Montagues set-theoretic semantics in one and
only one possible world (of any given interpretation) and may therefore be
taken as the intensional counterpart, i.e., the counterpart within the frame-
work of intensional logic, of that possible world.4 Understood in this sense,
Montagues commitment to possible worlds is now quite clear; for the sen-
tence:
9p(Worldfpg^_p)
is true at ever reference point of every interpretation.
9 On Quantifying over Possible Individuals
Quanticational reference to individuals that do not exist (at a given index) is
sometimes objected to by philosophers who otherwise have no qualms about
quantifying over propositions and relations-in-intension. Quantication with
respect to individual variables, these philosophers maintain, should be re-
stricted in content so as to apply only to the individuals that exist at the
index in question. This view, at least with respect to Montagues overall
semantic approach, is quite unwarranted and can in fact be refuted if the
3It has been suggested that possible worlds be added as a new type of entity altogether.
E.g., let s be a basic type along with e and t, i.e., let s 2 Type, and set Ds;U;I = I. (Cf.
Gallin [11], §8.)
4From the algebraic point of view of Montagues set-theoretic semantics, a world-
proposition might also be called an atomic proposition. (Cf. Gallin [11], § 11.) It should
be noted here that we are assuming that all of the logical constants involved in the above
denition have been dened in terms of the primitives of intensional logic and that, as so
dened, they cannot be assigned nonstandardmeanings.
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claim is that direct quantication over possible individuals cannot be justi-
ed using only the restricted quantiers referring to existing individuals in
modal or intensional contexts.
Consider, for example, the context of tense logic where the restricted
individual quantiers are supposed to refer only to the individuals existing
at the time of utterance; and, for convenience, let us use 8e and 9e for these
restricted quantiers. Then the view in question, as applied to this context,
maintains that the only signicant way we can quanticationally refer to
past or future individuals is indirectly, i.e., where these restricted quantiers
occur within the scope of the past or future tense operators; and, a fortiori,
on this view the only signicant way we can quanticational refer to possible
individuals in the context of modal or intensional logic is also indirectly,
i.e., where the restricted quantiers occur within the scope of the modal or
intension-forming operator.
Our counter-thesis is that by taking advantage of the pragmatic operators
available within Montagues general framework we can fully justify direct
quantication over past and future individuals in the context of tense logic
and direct quantication over merely possible individuals in the context of
modal or intensional logic. To show this, consider the problem of how we
might formalize the English sentence:
(8) There did exist someone who is an ancestor of everyone now existing.
using only indirect quantication over past individuals. In this case it is clear
that the symbolizations (where, for convenience, the variables are understood
to range only over persons):
P9eu8evAncestor(u;v)
will not do, because this formula represents the di¤erent English sentence:
There did exist someone who was an ancestor of everyone then existing.
Clearly, what we need here is a way, whether primitive or dened, of directly
quantifying over past as well as over presently existing individuals. E.g.,
using 8p and 9p for such quantiers, we can formalize (8) above as:
9pu8evAncestor(u;v)
And of course a completely analogous argument shows the need for a way,
whether primitive or dened, of directly quantifying over future individuals.
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Now the point of our counter-thesis is not that there are examples that
clearly show the need for directly quantifying over past and future individ-
uals in the context of tense logic, or for directly quantifying over possible
individuals in the context of modal or intensional logic; but rather that by
fully utilizing the pragmatic orientation of Montagues semantics we can in
fact actually dene the quantiers needed for such direct quantication in
terms of the restricted quantiers occurring within the scope of the tense,
modal or intension-forming operators.
As it turns out, what is needed to realize this type of denition is the
pragmatic operator N for it is now the case that, as developed by Hans
Kamp, one of Montagues former students (Kamp [14]). The introduction of
this operator, Kamp has noted, requires a procedure of double (rather than
single) indexing and a redenition of truth at an index to truth at an index
when part of an utterance in the present context of use; and of course it also
requires specifying that index in each interpretation that is to be regarded as
the present context of use in that interpretation. This supplementation of the
relevant parameters involved in the analysis of truth is of course completely
within the spirit of the pragmatic orientation of Montagues semantics.
Using the pragmatic now-operator in the analysis of (8), we see now how
to avoid assuming the prior introduction of the quantiers 8p and 9p . For
in this case, the formula
P9euN8evAncestor(u;v)
fully captures all that we want to say with (8) using only indirect quanti-
cation over past individuals. And of course what this analysis indicates is
that (at least with respect to the present context of use) we can contextually
dene direct quantication over past individuals in general:
8pu' =df:P:8euN'
9p' =dfP9euN'
Naturally, essentially the same pattern of denition su¢ ces to dene direct
quantication over future individuals; and assuming that the modal operator
is interpreted either as in Montagues rst version of intensional logic or is
dened as above in terms of the intension-forming operator, we can then
similarly dene direct quantication over possible individuals as follows:
8u' =df8eN'
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9u' =df9euN'
Thus the claim that only indirect quantication over possible individuals
should be allowed in intensional logic is, as we have said, quite unwarranted.
Whether, on the other hand, there are reasons to prefer dening 8 and 9 as
above in terms of 8eand 9e or for dening 8e and 9e, as Montague (in e¤ect)
does, in terms of 8 and 9 and a predicate for existsis another question alto-
gether; but one which we shall not go into here. (This question is discussed
in Cocchiarella [15].)
10 Universal Grammar
While the development of intensional logic as a new theoretical framework for
philosophy marked one important shift in Montagues philosophy of language,
the development of his universal grammar as a universal syntax and semantics
applicable to natural as well as to articial languages has come to mark an
even more important shift not only for Montague but for many logicians and
linguists as well. Natural languages, according to Montague, are no longer
to be distinguished from the articial languages of logicians on the grounds
that only the latter have a mathematically precise syntax and semantics;
and, indeed, in this regard Montagues universal grammar is intended to
comprehend the syntax and semantics of both kinds of languages within a
single natural mathematically precise theory([5], p. 222).
It is important to note here that the mathematically precise theory Mon-
tague has in mind for universal grammar is in e¤ect a denitional exten-
sion of set theory (with proper classes). This is particularly noteworthy in
that it may seem in the present context that Montague has thrown over his
new theoretical framework for philosophy in favor of the old. To the con-
trary, however, intensional logic serves for Montague not only as an example
within universal grammar of an important articial language but also, and
more importantly, as a semantical framework in its own right and into which
extensive portions of natural language are to be translated by means of a
rigorously described theory of translation that Montague also formulates as
part of universal grammar. Such a rigorously characterized translation into
intensional logic induces, according to Montague, a more perspicuous inter-
pretation for the expressions of a natural language then would otherwise be
given them in purely set-theoretic terms. The sense, moreover, in which in-
tensional logic transcends set theory even while being metamathematically
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justiedby set-theoretic constructions remains no less in force in universal
grammar than when these constructions were given independently of such a
single comprehensive theory.
Despite this transcendence, Montague does formulate his universal gram-
mar in purely set-theoretical terms and distinguishes in that grammar both
a universal syntax and universal semantics. (The term universalis meant
here only in the logico-mathematical sense of utmost generality). As applied
to any given language, the basic aim of the syntax is to characterize the
various syntactical categories, including especially the category of declara-
tive sentences, of that language, while the basic aim of the semantics is to
characterize the notions of a true sentence (under an interpretation) and of
entailment between the sentences of that language ([5] , p. 223). The two
components are intimately related by Montague in that where L is a language
and A is an interpretation for L, there exists in A a semantical operation cor-
responding to each structural operation in the syntax of L; and, furthermore,
in that part of his semantics that Montague called the theory of reference,
there will in addition be a unique semantic category corresponding to each
syntactic category of L (though the correspondence will in general only be
many-one and not one-to-one).
Montagues theory of reference, we should note, is essentially a model
theory based upon the set of types already described for intensional logic and
involves assigning the model-theoretic counterparts of senses or intensions as
well as the more usual extensions to expressions. Senses di¤er in this regard
from meanings in Montagues semantics in that they, but not meanings, are
intensional entities that are sometimes denoted by expressions([5], p. 228).
The types in general, whether extensional or intensional, are in fact the
semantic categories that are to be associated with the syntactic categories
of a language L; and, moreover, it is precisely because a type is assigned
to each syntactic category of L that the more perspicuous interpretation of
L that is induced by its translation into intensional logic can be e¤ected.
Thus, in a way the real point of the set-theoretical framework is to serve
rst as a syntactical metalanguage within which the syntax of any language
whatsoever might be described, including the language of intensional logic,
and, secondly, to serve in that regard as the syntactical basis of a theory
of translation within or by means of which each such language might be
translated into intensional logic and thereby be given its most perspicuous
semantical representation.
Montagues set-theoretical description of a language L amounts in e¤ect
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to identifying L with a system hL; Ri, where L is a (syntactically) disam-
biguated language (and therefore an articial construct) and R is a binary
relation (of syntactical analysis) with the set of proper expressions of L as
its domain and the set of proper expressions of L as its range. R will in gen-
eral by many-one, relating several disambiguated proper expressions of L
(as alternative analyses) with each syntactically ambiguous proper expres-
sion of L. The disambiguated construct L is dened by Montague to be a
system hA;F; X; S; 0i2 ;2, where hA;Fi2  is a free algebra generated
by U2X, with A as the set of proper expressions of L and each F a struc-
tural operation on strings of members of A (resulting in new members of A)
and with the sets X being the sets of basic phrases of each of the categories
of L,  being the set of indices of these syntactic categories and 0 being
the index of the category of the declarative sentences of L; and where S,
the syntactical rules of L, is a set of sequences of the form hF; hi<; i,
where  2  ,  is the number of places of the operation F,  2  for all
 < , and  2 . (A syntactical rule as described in e¤ect stipulates that
the structural operation F operates on a -place string of proper expres-
sions, each of category , respectively, for all  < , and results in a proper
expression of category ). The family of phrases of the syntactic categories
of L that are generated in this way in L is inductively characterized as the
smallest indexed family hPi2 of subsets of A such that (1) X  P, for
all  2 , and (2) whenever hF; hi<; i 2 S and a 2 P , for all  < ,
then F(hai<) 2 P.
11 The Translation of English into Intensional
Logic
We shall forego the set-theoretical details of Montagues general theory of
translation and briey illustrate instead the particular translation Montague
gave for the fragment of English formulated in [6]. The fragment is philo-
sophically interesting in its own right, moreover, just for the novelties and
insights it exhibits, such as, e.g., Montagues unied treatment of quantier
phrases and terms of English. Indeed, it is the particular type of formulation
Montague gave for this fragment of English as well as the form of its trans-
lation into intensional logic that has been developed in recent years into an
active, and apparently fruitful, eld of research at the interface of linguistics
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and logic.5
Montague denes the set of syntactic categories for the fragment of Eng-
lish in question to be the smallest set K such that (1) the two basic types t
and e of intensional logic are in K, and (2) whenever A and B are in K, then
so are A=B and A==B. (K. Ajdukiewicz, the originator of categorial gram-
mar, allowed only one compound category, A=B, to be generated from the
more basic categories A and B. Montagues introduction and use of two such
compounds is in itself already a novelty of his grammar, and he notes that in
connection with other languages it is quite conceivable that a larger number
would be required([6], p. 249).) Some of the more important traditional
categories that are in K are:
IV = t=e (the category of intransitive verb phrases)
T = t=IV (the category of terms)
TV = IV=T (the category of transitive verbs)
IAV = IV=IV (the category of IV-modifying adverbs)
CN = t==e (the category of common noun phrases)
Associated with each of the above compound categories, and several oth-
ers, are the sets of words or phrases that are taken by Montague to be the
basic phrases of English belonging to these categories and from which, by
means of the syntactical rules, the more complex phrases of these categories
are to be constructed. Thus, e.g., words like run, walk, talkand rise
are stipulated as being basic expressions of category IV ; and adverbs like
rapidlyand slowlybelong to category IAV , while adverbs like necessar-
ilybelong to category t=t. Phrases for propositional attitudes, e.g., believe
that, assert that, etc., appropriately belong to category IV=t, while phrases
like try to, wish to, etc., belong to category IV==IV , which is syntactically
quite di¤erent from the category of adverbs IAV = IV=IV .
One of the general forms of the syntactical rules by means of which the
more complex phrases of English belonging to these categories are to be gen-
erated can be described as follows: if  is a phrase of the compound category
A=B and  is a phrase of the categoryB, then Fi(;) is a phrase of category
5See especially the collection of papers in Partee (ed.) [16]. Partees essay Montague
Grammar and Transformational Grammar[17] is an excellent introduction to a variety of
the issues involved in combining Montague grammar with transformational grammar.
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A, where Fi is the structural operation associated with the syntactical rule
in question. (As a set-theoretical construction of universal grammar the syn-
tactical rule in question is identied with the three-tuple hFi; hA=B;Bi; Ai.
A similar rule hFi; hA==B;Bi; Ai is given for the compound category CN ,
as dened above, and for IV==IV .6) Rules of this form are called rules of
functional application; and taken together with the other syntactical rules
Montague described they yield a simultaneous inductive denition of the sets
PA of phrases of English of each syntactic category A.
In regard now to Montagues translation of this fragment of English into
intensional logic, let us note that the translation is to be based rst upon
a certain mapping of the syntactic categories of English into the semantical
types of intensional logic and then upon the construction of a rule of transla-
tion corresponding to each of the syntactical rules involved in the simultane-
ous inductive denition of the sets PA. The translation relation constructed
in this way will not be a function, of course, given the phenomena of semantic
ambiguity in English; but by means of an analysis relation, which Montague
dened in terms of analysis trees (cf. [4], pp. 204-207), we can speak instead
of the translation of a meaningful expression of English corresponding to any
given analysis tree for that expression. For convenience, however, we shall
ignore further mention of analysis trees here.
The form of the mapping of syntactic categories into semantic types can-
not be ignored here, however; for aside from the obvious association of the
simple syntactic categories e and t with the simple semantic types e and t,
the mapping Montague dened is based on two fundamental assumptions
regarding the semantics of English constructions. These are (1) that despite
important di¤erences in their syntactical roles in English, the compound cat-
egories A=B and A==B are to be assigned the same semantical type; and (2)
that in those cases where English constructions are generated by syntactical
or grammatical relations associated with compound categories, the construc-
tion is to be interpreted as a function whose arguments are always to be
senses or intensions. In particular, the general form of the semantical rules
of translation that correspond to the rules of functional application as de-
scribed above is paradigmatic for this type of interpretation: if  2 PA=B or
 2 PA==B,  2 PB , and  translates into 0 and  translates into 0, then
6Consider the two converse structural operations F6(;) =p 
q and F7(;) =p
q. The syntactical rules S8 and S10 of [6] apply as described above when  2 PIV==IV
and  2 PIV or when  2 PIV=IV and  2 PIV . Thus S8 generates, e.g., try to runas
an IV -phrase, while S10 generates run rapidlyas an IV -phrase.
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Fi(;) and Fj(;) translate into p0(
^b0)q.
The mapping that is based upon these two fundamental assumptions is
dened as follows, for arbitrary categories A and B:
f(e) = e
f(t) = t
F (A=B) = f(A==B) = hhs; f(B)i; f(A)i.
12 Quantier Phrases as English Terms
Now although there are expressions of type e in intensional logic denoting
individuals, there are no such related expressions in Montagues fragment
of English. There are of course English terms, i.e., phrases of category T ,
such as John, Mary, ninety, and even term variables he1, he2, etc.
The category T , however, as dened above, is not a basic but a compound
category t=IV ; that is, a term phrase when combined with an intransitive
verb phrase under a certain structural operation Fi results in a (declarative)
sentence-phrase, i.e., a phrase of category t (which is either a sentence of
English or like a sentence of English except for the occurrence of a variable
hen). Consequently, since f(T ) = f(t=IV ) = hhs; f(IV )i; ti, and since
f(IV ) = f(t=e) = hhs; ei; ti = the type of sets of individual concepts, then,
instead of denoting an individual, an English term denotes a set of properties
of individual concepts. Prima facie, this may seem somewhat anomalous, but
it really falls rather nicely into place once we notice that the terms of English
are in e¤ect what linguists call noun phrases and that noun phrases include
quantier phrases as well as proper nouns and denite descriptions. The
anomaly then, if any, is not that a term denotes a set of properties, but
that it denotes a set of properties of individual concepts rather than a set of
properties of individuals. (But more of this anon.)
Proper nouns and term variables, accordingly, are not the only term
phrases in Montagues fragment of English. In particular, there are three
syntactical rules hFi; CN; T i, for i = 0; 1; 2, such that if  is a common noun
phrase, where man, woman, sh, unicorn, etc., are examples of basic
CN -phrases, then F0() =pevery 
q, F1() =pthe 
q, and F2() =pa(n) 
q
are all phrases of category T .
This is of course a signicant departure from standard logical analy-
sis. But then it is also very much in line with the traditional (pre-Fregean)
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subject-predicate analysis of English sentences; and, not surprisingly, it al-
lows in this last regard for a more direct connection between the syntax and
semantics of English. It also allows, it turns out, for a more direct represen-
tation of intensional verbs that avoids the type of circumlocution described
earlier, such as paraphrasing seeksas tries to nd; and it provides in that
regard for a more realistic alternative to the rather common assumption that
opaque constructions in English are always to be paraphrased into construc-
tions involving the occurrence of a sentence or formula within the scope of a
modal operator (cf. Partee [18 ]).
Consider, for example, certain individual constants j, m and n of
intensional logic understood to denote the individuals John, Mary and the
number ninety. The English terms John, Mary and ninety, as noted
above, are not translated by Montague, into j, mand n, respectively,
but into pPPf^jgq;p PPf^mgq and pPPf^ngq where P is a variable
of type hs; hhs; ei; tii, i.e., of the type of properties of individual concepts.
Similarly, where  is a CN -phrase of English and  0 is its translation into
intensional logic, then pevery q, pthe q, and pa(n) q translate into:
P8x( 0(x)! Pfxg);
P9x( 0(x)$ y = x) ^Pfxg);
P9x( 0(x) ^Pfxg);
respectively, where xand yare variables of type hs; ei, i.e., of the type of
individual concepts. Here, of course, proper nouns, denite descriptions and
quantier phrases are all translated into expressions of intensional logic that
denote sets of properties of individual concepts.
Simple predication of a term and an IV -phase on this interpretation,
it should be noted, takes what the term denotes as the function and the
intension of what the IV -phrase denotes as the argument. Thus, e.g., the
English sentence John runsis translated by Montague into intensional logic
as follows:
(10) PPf^jg(^runs0)
where runs0is the translation of the English IV -phrase runs, and is there-
fore of type f(IV ) = hhs; ei; ti, i.e., of the type of sets of individual concepts;
and runstherefore is of type hs; hhs; ei; tii, i.e., of the type of properties of
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individual concepts. However, by obvious principles of intensional logic (10)
reduces to:
(11) runs0(^j)
which is now more nearly in line with standard logical analysis.
Of course, for an extensional IV -phrase such as runs, the (reduced)
translation (11) is still unduly intensional. Montague recties this by rst
dening:
=dfu(
^u)
where  2 MEf(IV ) and uis an individual variable of type e, and by then
giving a meaning postulate of the form:
[(x)$ (
_
x)]
for any  that translates an extensional IV orCN -phrase. (Note that because
 is of type hhs; ei; ti, i.e., of the type of sets of individual concepts, then  is
of type he; ti, i.e., of the type of sets of individuals.) Thus, given that runs
is an extensional IV -phrase, (11) reduces to
(12) runs0(j)
which is exactly what the standard logical analysis of John runscomes to.
Needless to say, but an entirely similar analysis applies to the English
sentence Every man runs, which is directly translated as:
P8x[man0(x)! Pfxg](^runs0)
and which rst reduces to:
8x[man0(x)! runs0(x)]
but which can be further reduced to:
8u[man0(u)! runs0(u)]
assuming that manis an extensional CN -phrase.
For extensional transitive verbs, i.e., English phrases of category TV , the
situation is analogous, though somewhat more involved since TV = IV=T ,
and therefore f(TV ) = hhs; f(T )i; f(IV )i. That is, what a transitive verb
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denotes in intensional logic is a function whose arguments are the intensions
of terms; and for sentences with extensional transitive verbs, this means that
not only must we reduce the intensionality of the subject term of the resulting
IV -phrase but also that of the term that is the direct object of the transitive
verb. Thus, e.g., where love0translates the English TV -phrase loves, we
translate Mary loves Johnand Mary loves every manrst into:
PPf^mg(^love0(P^Pf^jg))
and
PPf^mg(^love0(P^8x[man0(x)! Pfxg));
which, again by obvious principles of intensional logic, reduce to7:
love0(^m; P^Pf^jg)
and
love0(^m; P^8x[man0(x)! Pfxg])
which in turn, by the meaning postulate regarding the extensionality of
loves8, reduce to:
love0(m; j)
and
8x[man0(x)! love0(m;u)];
the second of which reduces nally to:
8u[man0(u)! love0(m;u)]:
7Regarding the use of relational notation in intensional logic, we set
(;) =df()()
 2MEhb;ha;tii,  2MEa and  2MEb.
8Given the denition:
=dfvu(
^
u;PPf^vg)
the meaning postulate for when  translates an extensional transitive verb is:
[(x;P)$Pfy^(
_
x;
_
y)g]
where P ranges over properties of properties of individual concepts and x, yrange over
individual concepts.
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The fact that transitive verbs are interpreted as functions whose argu-
ments are the intensions of term phrases is of course but one example of
Montagues general assumption, cited earlier, regarding the interpretation
of English constructions based upon compound categories. It is this fact in
particular that, together with his treatment of quantier phrases as term
phrases, enabled Montague to explain and represent the opacity of transi-
tive verbs, such as seekand conceive, without resorting to circumlocution
or paraphrase. Indeed, the fact is that this opacity is but a feature of the
intensionality that is assigned to all transitive verbs, and it is precisely this
opacity that needs to be eliminated by meaning postulates in those contexts
in which the verb is to be given an extensional interpretation.
Consider, for example, the di¤erent treatment that seekreceives in the
translations of John seeks a unicornwhen this is given its de dicto reading:
PPf^jg(^seek0(P^9x[unicorn0(x) ^Pfxg]));
which reduces to:
seek0(^j; P^9x[unicorn0(x) ^Pfxg])
from when it is given its de re reading:
9x[unicorn0(x) ^ seek0(^j; P^Pfxg)];
which, given the extensionality of unicorn, can be reduced to:
9u[unicorn0(u) ^ seek0(^j; P^Pf
^
ug)];
but which can be reduced even further in this case to:
9u[unicorn0(u) ^ seek0(j;u)]:
Here, it is because intensionality is the rule that the opacity of seekcan
be directly represented without resorting to circumlocution and paraphrase;
and in those cases in which the rule is not to apply, a meaning postulate
must be invoked so as to eliminate the intensionality and consequent opacity
of the verb, and context, in question.
It is not only transitive verbs that are assigned this intensionality, ac-
cording to Montague. We already saw above that meaning postulates are
needed in the case of extensional IV and CN -phrases as well. But the fact
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is, however, that not all CN and IV -phrases are extensional, and a uniform
interpretation that would render them all as such would therefore be quite
inappropriate. Consider in this regard the following clearly invalid argument:
The temperature is ninety;
the temperature rises;
therefore, ninety rises.
Montagues analysis, or reduced translations, of the sentences in this argu-
ment are:
9x[8y(temperature0(y)$ y = x) ^ [_y] = n];
9x[8y(temperature0(y)$ y = x) ^ rise0(x)]);
and
rise0(^n)
where xand yrange over individual concepts. Here we should especially
note that while the identity in question in the rst premise is not of two
individual concepts but only of their extensions at the present moment in the
real world, the truth of the second premise, according to Montague, depends
on the fact that the temperature, loosely speaking, denotesan individual
concept and not an individual, and that rise, unlike most verbs depends for
its applicability on the full behavior of individual concepts, not just on their
extensions with respect to the actual world and ... [present] moment of time
([6], p. 268). Thus, temperatureand riseare particular examples of an
intensional CN and IV -phrase, respectively; and it is precisely in order to
explain the invalidity of the above type of argument that Montague interprets
IV and CN -phrases in general as denoting sets of individual concepts rather
than sets of individuals. It is for this reason of course that English terms,
including quantier phrases, are interpreted by Montague as denoting sets of
properties of individual concepts rather than sets of properties of individuals.
13 Concluding Remarks
There are many other important features of Montagues grammar for English
and of his translation of English by means of that grammar into intensional
logic that we cannot go into here. The highly intensional nature of his se-
mantics, for example, provides not only a more direct analysis of the opacity
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of intensional verbs but also a more direct analysis of the opacity of innitive
phrases as well. And then there is his treatment of relative clauses and of
attributive adjectives, which we have not touched upon at all.
In closing then, it will no doubt have crossed the readers mind that there
may be some irony in the fact that Montague began his philosophical career
as an extensionalist who took set theory as the proper theoretical framework
for philosophy and as a formal-language philosopher who viewed the formal-
ization of ordinary language as either impossible or extremely laborious, and
in any case as certainly not philosophically rewarding. For the fact is that
Montague has made important and philosophically innovative contributions
toward a fully formalized syntax and semantics for natural language and that
the semantics in question is most perspicuously described in terms of an in-
tensional logic that transcends set theory and that in e¤ect constitutes a new
theoretical framework for philosophy. If this is not a revolution, it is at least
a form of progress in the logical analysis of language.
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